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Abstract
The Linda shared space model and its derivatives provide great /exibility for building paral-
lel and distributed applications composed of independent processes. However, the shared space
model does not provide protection against untrustworthy processes. Linda processes communicate
by reading and writing messages in a globally visible data space, so a malicious process can
launch any number of security attacks. This paper presents the design of a new coordination
model which extends Linda with 3ne-grained access control. The semantics of the model is
presented in the context of a process calculus. A prototype of our model, called SECOS, has
been implemented in JAVA. c© 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
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1. Introduction
Coordination is the theory and practice of assembling software systems out of inde-
pendently developed components. Coordination in open networks such as the Internet
is particularly di8cult since the processes to coordinate might not be trustworthy. Thus
coordination infrastructures must provide mechanisms to protect applications, as well
as the overall system, against attacks. This paper presents the design of a coordination
infrastructure named SECOS, built on top of the JAVA programming language, as an
extension of Gelernter’s Linda [12] coordination language.
Linda [12,13] is an elegant coordination model for parallel and weakly distributed
systems in which processes communicate by generating new message objects and plac-
ing these objects in a shared data space for other processes to retrieve. The space
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is commonly known as a tuple space, and the objects stored in the space are called
tuples since they are ordered sequences of basic data types. This programming model,
often referred to as generative communication, allows for interaction between processes
separated in time: since the data space is persistent, a message can be retrieved any-
time after it has been placed. Processes are also separated in space: communicating
processes need not know each other’s identity, nor have a dedicated connection es-
tablished between them. Linda is therefore suitable for anonymous communication and
resource discovery protocols [26], and for coordinating mobile components [7,20,21].
Several coordination infrastructures have implemented this model by embedding the
basic tuple space operations in a host language [11,17,18,23].
The Linda model provides three operations,1 out, rd and in; informally their
semantics is:
• out 〈 x; y; : : : 〉: writes tuple 〈 x; y; : : : 〉 to the data space without blocking.
• in 〈 x; y; : : : 〉z: blocks until a tuple matches the template 〈 x; y; : : : 〉; if several candi-
dates are found, then one is nondeterministically removed from the space and bound
to variable z.
• rd 〈 x; y; : : : 〉 z: behaves like in except that the matching tuple is not removed from
the space.
The main distinguishing characteristic of Linda is the pattern matching of tuples in
input requests. The simplest form of pattern matching is by equality comparison.
Thus for example, a process may retrieve a tuple such as 〈 1; 2; “xyz” 〉 by executing
in 〈 1; 2; “xyz” 〉x. The input operation will block if the tuple is not in the shared space.
The space is thus the basic mechanism for process synchronization. Processes may also
use partially de3ned templates. The special value “?” denotes 3elds that can take any
value, to describe the data that they wish to retrieve. The tuple 〈 1; 2; “xyz” 〉 can be
matched by input requests such as in 〈 ?; 2,“xyz” 〉x, in 〈 1; ?; “xyz” 〉x, in 〈 1; 2; ? 〉x, and
in 〈 ?; ?; ? 〉x. Partially de3ned templates allow processes to exchange information, and
thus are the basic mechanism for process communication in Linda.
The main obstacle to the use of Linda for coordinating untrusted components is the
lack of any protection mechanism in the basic model. Without a means to constrain
the behavior of processes running in the shared data space, there is simply no way to
prevent a malicious or faulty process from wrecking havoc on an entire system. For
instance, consider the simplest of processes, one which repeatedly removes an arbitrary
tuple from the space, 2
! in 〈 〉 x . 0:
1 For simplicity, we do not consider predicate forms (inp and rdp) which are non-blocking variants
of some operations, although they are provided in SECOS. Furthermore Linda introduced another basic
operation, eval, for starting new threads of computation, which is unnecessary when the host language is
concurrent.
2 For the sake of brevity, examples are given using the syntax of the secure spaces calculus introduced
in Section 3, rather than in the concrete syntax of the SECOS implementation.
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Here 〈 〉 denotes a template that can match any tuple; in 〈 〉 x . 0 denotes a process that
reads a tuple and then evolves to the inert process, and the exclamation mark denotes
in3nite repetition. The above process indiscriminately removes messages that are part
of ongoing protocols, thus starving or at least disrupting the processes running them.
Another example of dangerous behavior is demonstrated by a process that eavesdrops
on messages exchanged in the space,
! in 〈 〉 x . (out x | : : :):
The process repeatedly inputs a random tuple and outputs it again retaining a copy
bound to x. This does not interfere with other users of the data space, but lets the
process peek at the data exchanged between unrelated processes.
These were examples of integrity and privacy attacks. Another kind of attack is
denial of service. The following process repeatedly deposits tuples in the shared space,
! out 〈 1 〉:
Without any limitation on tuple lifetimes or bound on the number of iterations, any
implementation of a shared data space will eventually run out of memory.
The extreme simplicity of these three malicious processes underscores the lack of
protection in coordination infrastructures. The goal of this research is to investigate
how to extend a coordination model with support for 3ne-grained access control. The
challenge we are faced with is to provide access control mechanisms without losing
the /exibility that makes generative communication attractive. With the exception of
KLAIM [20] and JavaSpaces [11], we are not aware of any work in this direction. Our
approach is to investigate language design issues and to provide a practical solution
to the problem of coordinating untrusted processes. This paper presents the semantics
of a new coordination model and discusses the implementation of a prototype system
called SECOS embedded in the JAVA programming language.
2. Coordination with secure spaces
In this paper we present a coordination model, referred to as secure spaces, which ex-
tends Linda with 3ne-grained access control to the shared data space. The motivation
for the design of secure spaces comes from the di8culty in engineering a compre-
hensive security architecture that enforces the security requirements of a variety of
applications without being overly restrictive. Rather than enforcing a speci3c security
policy in the model, we chose to de3ne a set of simple mechanisms that can be used
by application logic to e8ciently implement a range of security policies.
The core idea of secure spaces is simple: we protect every 3eld of a tuple with a
lock. A lock prevents unauthorized processes from gaining access to the data held in
the 3eld. Instead of storing tuples made up of an ordered sequence of 3elds, a secure
space stores objects consisting of locked 3elds, each of these 3elds being composed
of a label and a value. The label can be thought of as specifying the key needed to
unlock the value. The semantics of secure spaces have been designed to ensure that
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processes that do not have the key required to gain access to a 3eld may not gain
any information about the 3eld’s contents. This also requires hiding such 3elds during
pattern matching.
The remainder of this section informally introduces the concepts of the secure space
coordination model. To specify the semantics of secure spaces without having to deal
with the syntax of an actual programming language, for example JAVA which is the
host language of SECOS, we introduce secure spaces in terms of a process calculus that
gives a precise semantics to the secure space primitives. This calculus is presented in
Section 3.
2.1. Objects and locks
In secure spaces, an object is an unordered set of locked 3elds, or locks. A secure
space is a multiset of objects. Locks are labeled values, the 3eld’s value can be an
object and is the data part of the 3eld. The label regulates access to the contents as it
speci3es which key is needed to unlock the value. We use labels, which have to be
distinct, to select 3elds instead of indices.
A locked 3eld can only be unlocked with a key matching the 3eld’s label. But
unlocking a 3eld does not grant access to other 3elds in an object, only to that 3eld’s
value. To implement this privacy feature, the rules for extracting values from an object
as well as the pattern matching rules used to retrieve objects from the shared space
have been modi3ed.
There are two kinds of primitive locks, symmetric locks (s-locks) and asymmetric
locks (a-locks), as well as a derived form called object locks (o-locks). The simplest
locks are symmetric where the same key is used to lock and unlock 3elds. For example,
the Linda tuple 〈 3; “xyz” 〉 can be represented by the following secure spaces object,
〈 aa : 3 bb : “xyz” 〉:
Labels aa and bb denote symmetric keys protecting values 3 and “xyz”, respectively.
These keys must be presented in order to gain access to the value of the locks or to
construct a template that will match this object. The pattern matching rules of s-locks
are a kind of structural subtyping, where shorter objects match longer ones with the
same labels.
To select a value from an object, a process must present the corresponding key. In
the case of an s-locked 3eld such as aa : b3 for example, the matching key is aa itself.
Thus the following expression evaluates to 3,
〈 aa : 3 bb : “xyz” 〉 : aa
Labels are 3rst-class values in our model, and can be transmitted in objects. Fur-
thermore, processes can generate fresh labels, written as (new ab). So, the following
program creates a new key and uses it in the s-lock guarding x.
(new aa) out 〈 aa : x 〉:
Since labels are lexically scoped, we have eNectively locked x and thrown away the
key.
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Asymmetric locks (a-locks) are pairs consisting of a label ab and its inverse ba
such that if ab locks a 3eld, then only ba can unlock it. An example of an a-locked
object is
〈 ab : 1 〉:
One obvious use of asymmetric locks is to publish one of the labels, ab, as a public
key and keep the other, ba, as a private key. The pattern matching rules for a-locks
require the use of the inverse key, in the above example ba, to retrieve an object lock
with an a-lock. Thus an object locked with a public key is pattern matched using the
private key.
2.2. Pattern matching
Secure spaces have diNerent pattern matching rules than Linda. In secure spaces,
pattern matching does not rely on the order of occurrence of 3elds in an object, but
rather on 3eld labels. As 3elds can contain objects, pattern matching is de3ned recur-
sively on the complete object structure. To preserve privacy, 3elds that are not present
in a template are considered hidden and are therefore not used in pattern matching.
Thus as we mentioned earlier there is a certain similarity between pattern matching
and structural subsumption as a “longer” object is matched by a “shorter” template.
For instance, an output oNer such as,
out 〈 ab : b dd : e 〉
can be matched by the input request,
in 〈dd : e 〉 x:
Other matching templates for the same output are
〈 ba : b 〉; 〈 ba : ? 〉; 〈dd : ? 〉; 〈 ba : b dd : ? 〉; 〈 ba : b dd : e 〉; 〈 〉:
The empty object 〈 〉 can be used as a template to match any other object. Pattern
matching an a-locks requires presentation of the inverse key, e.g., the object 〈 ab : 〈 〉〉
is matched by 〈 ba : 〈 〉〉.
It is important to recall that retrieving an object does not grant access to its 3elds.
Without the appropriate keys, 3elds remain hidden, so even if an object is leaked to a
malicious process, the information it contains remains protected.
A simple key exchange protocol demonstrates the use of pattern matching rules.
Consider the following term in which two processes use a key pair (ab; ba) to exchange
the shared key cc:
(new cc)( out 〈 ab : cc 〉 | P ) | (in 〈 ba : ? 〉 x .Q):
The output term out 〈 ab : cc 〉 can be matched by in 〈 ba : ? 〉x because ba is the inverse
of ab and the wild card ? matches any value. The term thus reduces in one step,
(new cc)(P | Q{〈 ab : cc 〉=x}):
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In the resulting term, the key’s scope encloses P and Q, since both processes now
share cc. Furthermore, all occurrences of x in Q have been substituted with 〈 ab : cc 〉,
e.g., an expression x : ba in Q becomes 〈 ab : bc 〉 : ba and yields cc.
2.3. Extending objects
Another feature of secure space is that objects can be extended without revealing
their contents. An extension operation, denoted by ⊕, will add a new locked 3eld to
an object if the 3eld label is not already present, or, in the case a 3eld with that label
exists, will overwrite the value. The following is an example of an extension in which
the a-lock bc : “xyz” is added to object 〈 aa : 22 〉,
〈 aa : 22 〉 ⊕ bc : “xyz” yields 〈 a : 22 bc : “xyz” 〉
The process performing the extension need not know anything about the contents of
the object it is extending and will not gain any information as a result of extension.
Thus for instance, consider
〈 ab : 22 〉 ⊕ ab : “xyz” yields 〈 ab : “xyz” 〉:
Without the key ba, there is no way for the extending process to even know that the
object already had an ab 3eld, not to mention its value.
Object extension is essential to transparently tag objects, e.g., with lifetime annota-
tions. The conjunction of hidden 3elds and object extension allows us to implement
a user-level garbage collector that tags objects without knowledge of their internal
structure. This tagging does not aNect the behavior of applications that operate on the
tagged objects.
2.4. Locking objects
Up to this point, we have controlled access to 3elds, but not access to objects in
the shared space. For example it is often desirable to prevent processes from using
the empty template 〈 〉 to indiscriminately match and remove objects. We therefore
introduce object locks (o-locks) to restrict the visibility of objects from the pattern
matching process. A locked object is created with
out 〈 aa : 12 bb : 3 〉@cd;
where key cd is used to lock the object; a matching input could be
in 〈 bb : ? 〉@dc x .P:
Notice the use of the inverse key dc to retrieve the object. Asymmetric keys are
particularly interesting as they allow the expression of write-only and read-only access
rights to a secure space.
Object locks can be viewed as partitioning the shared memory. For some o-lock term,
out 〈 f˜ 〉@‘, the key ‘ creates a partition of the space, such that the only processes
that may write to it are ones that know ‘, and processes that want to read from the
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partition must have the inverse key P‘. In this sense, o-locks may be viewed as giving
the same expressive power as variants of Linda with multiple tuple spaces [6,13,16,25],
but they are more /exible. With multiple tuple spaces, a process is granted wholesale
access to the space whenever it gets the space’s identi3er. Object locks can be used
to give very limited and controlled access to a partition. For instance, it is possible to
restrict a process to input only one kind of object. Consider a con3guration in which
processes P and Q are running in parallel and Q wants to grant P read-access to some
partition cd of the space. One solution would be to give the inverse key dc to P. But
this would permit P to retrieve any object in the partition and also to extract the value
of 3elds locked under cd. Assuming that P should only retrieve objects that contain
the key aa and should not select 3elds labeled with cd, a better solution is to hand P
a template, for example 〈 ac : ? 〉@dc, rather than a key, that it can use for matching.
Let P and Q be as follows:
P = in 〈 bb : ? 〉 x . in (x:bb)y . : : :
and
Q = (new cd)(out 〈 bb : 〈 aa : ? 〉@dc 〉 | Q′):
The term P | Q reduces in one step to
(new cd) (in 〈 aa : ? 〉@cd y . : : : | Q′);
P can use the template to retrieve objects but has no means to get at the label dc. In
particular, it does not have access to either of the partition keys (cd and dc) so it can
neither add new objects nor select 3elds protected by these keys.
In the secure spaces calculus o-locks are a derived concept, Section 3.3 gives a
translation from terms containing o-locks to terms in the core calculus.
3. The secure spaces calculus
The secure spaces calculus is based on the asynchronous -calculus [2,3,15], because
 provides a small and elegant concurrent programming language with simple semantics
and thus allows for a compact formulation of secure spaces in computationally complete
setting. The main departure from the -calculus is the use of generative communication
operations instead of channel-based primitives. The idea of embedding Linda in a
process calculus has been explored in depth in previous work [5,10]. The emphasis
of this paper is on language design issues rather than on expressiveness. Since type
checking is not the focus of this paper, the secure spaces calculus is untyped and
allows ill-formed processes to be written. Type errors cause processes to get stuck and
prevent further reduction.
3.1. Syntax
The syntax of the core calculus is summarized in Table 1. We take an in3nite set
of names ranged over by meta-variables a; b; c; d. Labels are pairs of name, written
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Table 1
Core language syntax
e ::= x | v | 〈 e˜ : e˜ 〉| e:e | e⊕ e : e
v ::= ? | ‘ | 〈 f˜ 〉
f ::= ‘ : v
P ::= 0 |P | Q | !P |in e x .P| out e | (new ab)P
ab, and ranged over by meta-variable ‘. If a= b, we call label ab a symmetric key,
otherwise it is an asymmetric key. The inverse of a key ab is the key ba, an auxiliary
inverse function, written P· , is de3ned as ab= ba and ab= ab. Basic values are ranged
over by v, and consist of labels, objects, and ?. The symbol ? denotes the distinguished
void element. Locked 3elds, ranged over by f, are written ab : v. Objects are, possibly
empty, vectors of locks, written 〈 f˜ 〉. The function keys (f˜) returns the set of labels
of the vector f˜.
The syntactic category of expressions, ranged over by e, includes basic values,
objects, selection expressions and extension expressions. The syntactic category of
processes, ranged over by P and Q, includes the empty process 0 which has no be-
havior, parallel composition of processes P | Q, replication of processes !P, as well as
two communication primitives. The 3rst of these is the input operation in e x .P which
tries to match the template e against an output oNer and bind the result to variable
x. The operation is blocking; P cannot execute until the match succeeds. The second
operation is the asynchronous output out e which deposits the object denoted by e in
the data space. Finally, the restriction operator (new ab) generates a fresh key pair ab
and ba. The calculus is lexically scoped, so (new ab)P means that ab and ba are visible
only in process P.
3.2. Operation semantics
The operational semantics of the secure spaces calculus is given in Table 2. The
reduction relation P→P′ de3nes when process P reduces in one step of internal com-
putation to P′. We de3ne two auxiliary notions: structural congruence and evaluation.
Structural congruence ≡ is the least congruence on processes satisfying the axioms
and rules given in Table 2; it indicates when a process may replace another in a com-
putation in such a way that the computation yields an equivalent result. The evaluation
relation ↓ denotes the result of 3eld selection and object extension expressions. The
reduction relation → is the least relation on processes that satis3es the axioms and
rules de3ned in Table 2.
The notation e˜ denotes zero or more occurrences of e. The term P{e=x} represents
process P in which all free occurrences of x are replaced by e. Trailing inert processes
are removed; thus in e x . 0 becomes in e x. The free labels of a term are denoted by
fn( ), and de3ned in Table 3.
The main reduction rule determines when an input request can consume an output
oNer. If the output term evaluates to an object 〈 f˜ 〉, the input to an object 〈 f˜′ 〉,
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Table 2
Operational semantics
Reduction
P → Q
(new ab)P → (new ab)Q
;
P → Q
P | R→ Q | R ;
P ≡ P′ P′ → Q
P → Q ;
e ↓ 〈 f˜ 〉 e′ ↓ 〈 f˜′ 〉 〈 f˜′ 〉6 〈 f˜ 〉
out e | in e′ x .P → P{〈 f˜ 〉=x}
;
Evaluation
v ↓ v 〈 〉 ↓ 〈 〉 e ↓ 〈 f˜ 〉 〈 f˜ 〉 ≡ 〈 f˜
′ 〉
e ↓ 〈 f˜′ 〉
;
e ↓ 〈 ‘ : v f˜ 〉 e′ ↓ P‘
e:e′ ↓ v ;
e ↓ ‘ e′ ↓ v 〈 e˜ : e˜′ 〉 ↓ 〈 f˜ 〉 ‘ ∈ keys(f˜)
〈 e : e′ e˜ : e˜′ 〉 ↓ 〈 ‘ : v f˜ 〉
e ↓ 〈 f˜ 〉 e′ ↓ ‘ e′′ ↓ v
e⊕ e′ : e′′ ↓ 〈 ‘ : v (f˜ \ ‘) 〉
;
Structural congruence rules
〈 f˜ ‘ : v f˜′ 〉 ≡ 〈 ‘ : v f˜ f˜′ 〉; P | Q ≡ Q | P; P | 0 ≡ P; !P ≡ P | !P;
(P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R) (new ab)(new cd)P ≡ (new cd)(new ab)P;
(new ab)(P | Q) ≡ P | (new ab)Q if ab; ba ∈ fn (P);
Pattern matching rules
‘ 6 ‘ ?6 v 〈 〉6 〈 f˜ 〉;
v 6 v′ 〈 f˜ 〉6 〈 f˜′ 〉
〈 ‘ : v f˜ 〉6 〈 P‘ : v′ f˜ 〉
:
and the objects match, then the output oNer is consumed and the continuation P can
execute.
e ↓ 〈 f˜ 〉 e′ ↓ 〈 f˜′ 〉 〈 f˜′ 〉6 〈 f˜ 〉
out e | in e′ x .P → P{〈 f˜ 〉=x} :
The pattern matching relation 6 is a relation on values with ? as minimum element.
Objects are matched by pair-wise 3eld and key comparison, intuitively a shorter object
matches a longer if each 3eld ‘ : v of the shorter object has a corresponding 3eld P‘ : v′
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Table 3
Free keys
fn(0) = fn(x) = fn(?) = {}; fn(aa) = {aa};
fn(〈 e˜ : e˜′ 〉) =
⋃
fn(e˜) ∪
⋃
fn(e˜′)
fn(〈 e˜ : e˜′ 〉@‘) =
⋃
fn(e˜)∪
⋃
fn(e˜′)∪{‘; P‘}∪ fn(e)
fn(P | Q) = fn(P) ∪ fn(Q); fn(!P) = fn(P);
fn(out e) = fn(e); fn(in e x .P) = fn(e) ∪ fn(P);
fn((new ab)P) = fn(P)− {ab; ba}
and v6v′.
v′ 6 v 〈 f˜ 〉6 〈 f˜ 〉
〈 ‘ : v f˜ 〉6 〈 P‘ : v′f˜ 〉 :
Pattern matching is recursive in the value of labeled 3elds, so to determine that
〈 aa : 〈 bb : 〈 〉〉〉6 〈 aa : 〈 bb : 〈 〉cc : 〈 〉〉〉〉;
it is necessary to check that
〈 bb : 〈 〉〉6 〈 bb : 〈 〉 cc : 〈 〉〉:
On the surface the pattern matching relation appears to be a form of structural subtyp-
ing. But the presence of asymmetric keys ensures that the relation is neither re/exive
nor transitive, consider for example that both 〈 ab : ? 〉6〈 ba : ? 〉 and 〈 ba : ? 〉6〈 ab : 〈 〉〉
hold while 〈 ab : ? 〉6〈 ab : 〈 〉〉 does not.
The interesting cases of the evaluation relation are 3eld selection and object exten-
sion. Selection, e:e′, extracts a value from an object if e evaluates to an object and e′
to a label P‘ such that the inverse key ‘ is present in the object.
e ↓ 〈 ‘ : vf˜ 〉 e′ ↓ P‘
e:e′ ↓ v :
An error occurs in case the key is not present and the execution gets stuck.
The object extension operation, e⊕ e′ : e′′, adds a 3eld to an object, if a 3eld with
the same label is already present the old value is overridden. We write f˜\‘ to denote
the sequence of 3elds in which ‘ does not occur as a 3eld label.
e ↓ 〈 f˜ 〉 e′ ↓ ‘ e′′ ↓ v
e ⊕ e′ : e′′ ↓ 〈 ‘ : v(f˜\‘) 〉 :
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While a more detailed study of equivalences is beyond the scope of this work, we
expect that some simple secrecy properties hold in our calculus. For instance, the
values of locked 3elds are protected, thus for any context C[] if x does not occur free
in f˜, the following two expressions cannot be distinguished:
C[(new ab)out 〈 ab : y f˜ 〉] and C[(new ab)out 〈 ab : z f˜ 〉]:
The value of locked 3elds may not be observed without the matching key. On the
other hand the following terms are not equivalent:
C[(new ab)out 〈 ab : y f˜ 〉] and C[out 〈 f˜ 〉]:
In the case all 3eld labels in f˜ are symmetric, the terms can be distinguished because
an equality test can be encoded in the calculus. Term e=s e′ .P reduces to P if e
and e′ evaluate to objects with the same (symmetric) 3eld labels and =s values. The
encoding of the test is as follows assuming x does not occur free in P:
e =s e′ .P
def= out e | in e′ x . (out x | in e x .P):
The term reduces to P if and only if e ↓ v, e′ ↓ v′, v6v′ and v′6v.
3.3. Encoding object locks
Object locks control access to objects in secure spaces. The syntax for emitting an
object 〈 f˜ 〉 locked by ‘ is out 〈 f˜ 〉@‘, and the syntax for retrieving some
object matching template 〈 f˜ 〉 locked under ‘ is in 〈 f˜ 〉@‘ x .P. The semantics can
be expressed by the reduction rule,
e ↓ 〈 f˜ 〉 e′ ↓ 〈 f˜′ 〉 〈 f˜′ 〉6 〈 f˜ 〉
out e@‘ | in e′@ P‘ x .P → P{〈 f˜ 〉@‘=x} :
But the calculus need not be extended since o-locks can be expressed in the core
language. Table 4 gives an inductive de3nition of an encoding from terms with o-
locks to basic calculus terms. <P= denotes the translation of term P. The intuition is to
extend all objects with one or two additional 3elds. Locked objects will be extended
with a pair of 3elds ll and rr with, respectively, the o-lock key and its inverse as
values. For plain objects, an additional 3eld labeled ll and with value ll will be
inserted. We choose labels ll and rr so that they do not occur free in P.
To illustrate the translation, consider the following process:
< out 〈 cc : dd 〉@ab | in 〈 〉@ba y . 0 | out 〈 cc : dd 〉 | in 〈 〉y . 0 =
which yields,
out 〈 rr : ba ll : ab cc : dd 〉 | in 〈 rr : ab ll : ba 〉 . 0 |;
out 〈 ll : ll cc : dd 〉 | in 〈 ll : ll 〉 . 0
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Table 4
Translation from a calculus with object locks to the core calculus
<x= = x
<?= = ?
<〈 e˜ : e˜′ 〉= = 〈 <e˜= : <e˜′= 〉⊕ ll : ll
<〈 e˜ : e˜′ 〉@‘= = (〈 <e˜= : <e˜′= 〉⊕ ll : ‘)⊕ : rr : P‘
<e⊕ e′ : e′′= = <e=⊕ e′ : <e′′=
<e:e′= = <e=:e′
<P | Q= = <P= | <Q=
<!P= = ! <P=
<0= = 0
<out e= = out <e=
<in e x .P= = in <e= x . <P=
<(new ab)P= = (new ab)<P=
In the translated term it is clear that objects locked with an o-lock cannot be matched
by unlocked objects, consider the translation
<〈 〉@ba= = 〈 rr : abll : ba 〉 6 〈 rr : ba ll : ab cc : dd 〉 = <〈 cc : dd 〉@ab=:
According to the pattern matching rules these o-locked objects match. Now consider
the translation of the plain objects, they match as well.
<〈 〉= = 〈 ll : ll 〉 6 〈 ll : ll cc : dd 〉 = <〈 cc : dd 〉=:
But trying to match an o-locked object with an empty template will fail,
<〈 〉= = 〈 ll : ll 〉  〈 rr : ba ll : ab cc : dd 〉 = <〈 cc : dd 〉@ab=:
We conjecture that the terms <P | (new ab)out e@ab= and <P= are equivalent for all P.
That is, an o-locked object is protected from processes that do not have its key. This
is a fundamental security property of the SECOS coordination infrastructure.
4. Examples
In this section we give some examples of the use of secure spaces.
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Fig. 1. Streaming protocol.
4.1. Encoding Linda with secure spaces
It is legitimate to wonder whether any expressiveness has been lost going from
Linda’s positional notation to the secure space model with labeled 3elds. Furthermore,
we lost the rd operator in the process. We show how to recover both through encodings
in the core calculus.
The rd operator is encoded as an input followed by an output in parallel with a
continuation process:
rd e x .P def= in e x . (out x |P):
To recover positional notation, assume a set of labels ‘1; ‘2; ‘3; : : : chosen so that they
do not occur free in some term P written using positional notation, and assume also
that for any sequence, e˜= e e′ e′′; : : : ; the labeling function lab(e˜) takes a sequence of
expressions and creates a sequence of locked 3elds, lab(e˜) def= ‘1 : e ‘2 : e′ ‘3 : e′′; : : : :
The idea behind the translation is to label all 3elds of objects in P with these keys;
for instance out 〈 e e′ 〉 becomes out 〈 ‘1 : e ‘2 : e′ 〉. Inputs are labeled in a similar way.
Pattern matching lines up 3elds in the right order. We nevertheless have to take care
to prevent a template matching a longer object. This is done by encoding the length
of the tuple in an additional 3eld. The correct translation for a tuple output operation
becomes out 〈 ‘1 : e ‘2 : e′ ‘len : ‘2 〉. With this translation, it is obvious that positional
notation may be mixed with locked 3elds, giving a rich choice of programming styles.
4.2. Secure communication protocols
The process of securing a system begins with the task of identifying the resources
or information to be protected, and the most likely sources of attacks. Only then
can suitable protection mechanisms be designed. We apply this principle to a simple
example to identify some of the weaknesses of Linda with respect to security.
The following streaming protocol (in pseudo-code) is typical of generative commu-
nication. Its goal is to transfer the contents of an array (v) from a sender process to
some other receiver process. The sender process starts by outputting a header message
that contains an identi3er for this particular protocol run (here some value j), and the
length of the array (i). Then each array element is output together with the run iden-
ti3er. Furthermore, in order to enforce ordering each tuple also contains the sequence
number of the element (the complete tuple is 〈 j,i,v[i] 〉) (Fig. 1).
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The receiver uses the run identi3er and the sequence number to query the data space
for each array element.
There are four security properties relevant to this protocol. The 3rst property is
authenticity, the sender (resp. receiver) may require that its partner be a particular
process. Thus both parties may have to be authenticated to one another. Privacy protects
the data exchanged against disclosure, this means that each value v[i] must be hidden
from processes other than the designated receiver. Integrity implies that no process
should interfere with the protocol, e.g., by outputting tuples that the designated receiver
believes to have been placed by the designated sender. Finally, we require availability
to ensure that no process other than the receiver may remove a tuple containing a v[i]
from the space, as this would prevent the receiver process from continuing.
Linda-based coordination models cannot provide such security guarantees. The very
nature of generative communication allows a malicious process to mount attacks against
every one of these properties. We proceed to show examples of secure protocols in
our calculus.
4.2.1. Message privacy
The simplest example is one where two processes exchange data that no other
process should read. For this, secure spaces operations can be viewed as providing
protection analogous to cryptography. In order for two process to be able to exchange
private messages, they need to share a symmetric key. The following con3guration is
an example,
(new aa)(out 〈 aa : e 〉 | P | in 〈 〉 x .Q):
If process Q holds the key aa then it may retrieve the payload of the object 〈 aa : e 〉.
Of course, nothing prevents another process from matching the object with the empty
template, thus disrupting the protocol. A malicious process may also copy the object
and try to replay it later, but this can be prevented by traditional means such as adding
a nonce to the data.
4.2.2. Message authenticity
Guaranteeing authenticity of messages in open networks is often done by digitally
signing messages with the private key of the sender. The sender’s public key may
then be used to check that the message is authentic and that its contents are intact.
We adapt this idea to secure spaces, using pattern matching. To sign an object 〈 f˜ 〉
with the key ab, the sender process executes sign(out 〈 f˜ 〉; ab; ba). The intuition is that
a signed object contains an extra signature 3eld which matches the signed object’s
payload. So, that in order to authenticate the message, the receiver need only extract
the signature and match it with the message. The sign function is de3ned as
sign(out 〈 f˜ 〉; ab; ba) def=
(new c′c′)(new cc) outmark(〈 f˜ ab : cc cc : 〈 inverse (f˜) ba : cc cc : cc 〉 〉; c′c′)
cc; c′c′ ∈ fn(f˜):
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The auxiliary function mark is de3ned inductively on values
mark(〈 f˜ 〉; c′c′) = 〈 (markf˜; c′c′)c′c′ : c′c′ 〉
mark(‘ : v f˜; c′c′) = ‘ : mark(v; c
′
c′)mark(f˜; c
′
c′)
mark(‘; c′c′) = ‘;
mark(?; c′c′) = ?
The function’s role is to add an extra 3eld to all objects in f˜. The auxiliary function
inverse is de3ned inductively on values as follows:
inverse(〈 f˜ 〉) = 〈 inverse(f˜) 〉;
inverse(‘ : v f˜) = P‘ : inverse(v) inverse(f˜);
inverse(‘) = ‘;
inverse(?) = ?
The inverse function creates a matching replica of the payload of the message by re-
cursively inverting all 3eld labels. In an implementation of secure spaces the inverse
function would have to be built-in, and would not be made directly available to un-
trusted process as it could be used to construct templates with keys to which the process
does not have access. The mark function is used to tie the value to its signature so
that the signature may only be used to match the value and vice versa. This prevents
misuse of the signature.
To illustrate the signing of a message, consider the output term
sign (out 〈dd : d′d′′ d′d′′ : 〈dd : ? 〉〉; ab; ba):
Here the signed message will be the object
(new c′c′)(new cc) out 〈 dd : d′d′′
d′d′′ : 〈dd : ? c′c′ : c′c′ 〉
ab : cc
cc : 〈dd : d′d′′ d′′d′ : 〈dd : ? c′c′ : 〈 〉〉 ba : cc cc : cc c′c′ : c′c′ 〉
c′c′ : c
′
c′ 〉:
Notice that the payload is intact, but there are two extra 3elds, the 3rst is locked under
the private key ab and contains a fresh symmetric key cc, the second locked under cc
contains an almost exact replica of the object except that all asymmetric keys have
been replaced by their inverse and that the 3eld locked under cc holds an empty object.
The c′c′ 3eld has been added for technical reasons, without it a process could use the
signature as a template.
The receiver process has in its possession the public key ba. To authenticate a
message, the receiver will use authenticate(e; ba) .P which blocks if e does not evaluate
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to a message signed by ab. The de3nition of authenticate is
authenticate(e; ba) .P
def=
out e⊕ (e:ba) : (e:ba) |
in (e:(e:ba)) x . ( out x:(x:ba) | in (x⊕ (x : ba) : (x : ba))y .P)):
The variables x and y are chosen so that they do not occur free in P.
A message is considered authentic if an only if, it has exactly the same number of
3elds as when it was signed and all of the 3eld values are authentic. Luckily, pattern
matching performs this check. We have constructed two objects that should be identical,
modulo asymmetric keys, and we will use each of them in turn as a template to match
the other. If both matches succeed then the message is authentic and P can proceed. If
we consider the example term given above, let e=〈dd : d′d′′ d′d′′ : 〈dd : ? c′c′ : c′c′ 〉 ab : cc
cc : 〈dd : d′d′′d′′d′ : 〈dd : ? c′c′ : c′c′ 〉 ba : cc cc : cc c′c′ : c′c′ 〉 c′c′ : c′c′ 〉 the selection
expression e:(e:ba) yields the signature 〈dd : d′d′′ d′′d′ : 〈dd : ? c′c′ : c′c′ 〉 ba : cc cc : cc
c′c′ : c
′
c′ 〉. As such these objects do not match because of their cc 3elds. The object
extension expression e⊕ (e : ba) : (e : ba) overwrites the value of that 3eld and makes
the object match one another. Thus it is easy to check that
e⊕ (e:ba) : (e:ba)6 e:(e:ba)
and
e:(e:ba)6 e⊕ (e:ba) : (e:ba)
both hold.
The encoding is not entirely correct as a third party might disrupt the protocol
by inputting one of these objects using an empty template. The solution to prevent
accidental matches is to protect the objects with an o-lock. The correct encoding of
authenticate is thus,
authenticate(e; ba) .P
def=
(new cc)( out (〈 cc : e 〉@cc)⊕ (e:ba) : (e:ba) |
in 〈 cc : e:(e:ba) 〉@ccx . ( out 〈 cc : x:(x:ba) 〉@cc |
in (〈 cc : x 〉@cc)⊕ (x:ba) : (x:ba)y .P))
This encoding ensures that only the object yielded by e is considered for authentication,
and P will proceed if the object has been signed with key ab.
4.2.3. Secure channels
To ensure integrity and availability, an abstraction of secure channels should be
provided. A secure channel is a communication abstraction between two processes that
ensures no other process may read or write to that channel. We will demonstrate how
to set up a secure channel between two arbitrary processes P and Q using the secure
space primitives. Our only assumption is that one of the processes, for instance P
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which we call the initiator of the protocol, knows the other process’ public key, e.g.,
ab. This process will set up a secure channel by 3rst executing the establish(x; ab; cd; dc)
protocol, where x is the channel identi3er, ab is the interlocutor’s public key, cd is the
initiator’s public key and dc the corresponding private key. Once a connection has been
established, the processes can use send(x; e) to send an object e over secure channel x
and recv(x; e) to receive an object from the secure channel.
The implementation relies on o-locks to protect the data being exchanged, so that for
every send(x; e) there is an out e@‘ for some shared key ‘. The crux of the protocol
is to guarantee that ‘ is not divulged. The encoding of the send and receive operations
are quite simple. If we assume that ‘chn is a symmetric key and that x will evaluate to
an object with a ‘chn 3eld containing the shared key used to for that particular channel,
then the encoding of the operation is:
send(x; e) def= out e@(x:‘chn)
recv(x; e; y) .P def= in e@(x:‘chn)y .P:
To establish a session the initiator will create a symmetric key that will be used in
the o-lock and output an object 〈 ab : 〈 ‘pub : cd ‘chn : d′d′ 〉〉 containing its own public
key (locked under ‘pub) and the channel key (locked under ‘chn). This information is
itself locked with the public key of the other process (ab). The whole object is signed
with the initiator’s private key (dc). The initiator then waits for an acknowledgment
message which it authenticates with the other party’s public key. The acknowledgment
is expected to contain a ‘chn 3eld.
establish(x; ab; cd; dc) .P
def=
(new d′d′) ( sign(out 〈 ab : 〈 ‘pub : cd ‘chn : d′d′ 〉〉; dc; cd) |
in 〈 〉@d′d′x . authenticate(x; ab) .P ):
A process willing to accept a secure connection will run the accept(x; ba) protocol,
where x will be used as the channel identi3er and ba is a private key. The protocol
starts by reading an object that matches 〈 ba : ? 〉, that is to say, an object with at least
a 3eld locked under the public key ab. The process extracts the ‘pub 3eld from that
object and uses it to authenticate the message. The next step of the protocol is to
extract the value of the ab 3eld and bind it to variable x. Finally, the protocol sends
x as an acknowledgment signing it with it own private key.
accept(x; ba) .P
def=
in 〈 ba : ? 〉y . authenticate(y; (y:ba):‘pub) .
(new cc) ( out (y:ba)@cc | in〈 〉@ccx . (sign(send(x; x); ba; ab) | P)):
4.3. Memory management for shared spaces
Memory management is an important issue for shared data space implementations.
This, partly because spaces are long lived data structures, so any accidental memory
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Table 5
Marking and collection
tag(out e; aa) = (new ‘GC) (out e⊕ ‘GC : aa |
in 〈 〉@aa . (out x | in 〈 ‘GC : aa 〉))
collect(aa) = out 〈 〉@aa
leak will persist, but also because of the danger of denial of service attacks. Generative
communication precludes traditional garbage collection techniques since unlike pointer
based data structures there is no clearcut concept of reachability in a shared space.
One partial solution to this problem has been adopted by JavaSpaces [11], namely to
associate a time-to-live (TTL) with each object deposited in a JavaSpace, once the
TTL reaches 0, the object is removed from the space and its memory is reclaimed.
While this policy may work well in some cases, it still does not prevent one or more
processes to mount a denial of service attack. Furthermore the TTLs presuppose that
it is possible to estimate beforehand how long a particular object will be useful. Such
estimates are of course very di8cult. In some cases, it may be more appropriate to
be able to reclaim all the objects generated by a particular process. For example, if a
process violates a security policy, all of the objects it placed in the space might need
to be reclaimed. For other applications, it may be desirable to clean up any object left
over after a particular protocol run.
Clearly some /exibility is required. Secure spaces can implement all of these policies
as user-level programs. In other words, there is no need to hardwire any particular
policy. Instead diNerent applications can run diNerent memory reclamation algorithms
concurrently. The key to a user-level implementation is twofold. Firstly, the extra
information needed for reclamation, e.g., TTLs or ownership, must be encoded in each
object so that it is accessible to the collector but transparent from the application.
Secondly, uncooperative applications should not be able to trick the collector, nor
should the reclamation algorithm be able to gain information about the contents of the
objects that it is collecting.
4.3.1. Tagged object collection
The simplest of memory reclamation schemes is for each application to voluntarily
tag every object it outputs, with a time-to-live for instance, and every so often to
run a collector process that locates all objects with a particular tag and removes them
from the space. The idea is simple, every output term will be marked by executing
tag(out e; aa), where aa should be a fresh symmetric key that will play the role of a
tag (e.g., a TTL). Then to reclaim all objects tagged with aa, the process need only
execute collect(aa) (Table 5).
The encoding of these operations is straightforward. Tagging implies the creation of
a fresh symmetric key ‘GC and extension of the output object with the s-lock ‘GC : aa.
Using a new label guarantees that the 3eld is hidden from other processes and also
prevents an attacker from trying to overwrite the 3eld with a fake tag. In parallel with
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Table 6
Process marking
<out e=aa = tag(out e; x)
<in e y .P=aa = in e y : <P=aa
<(new bc)P=aa = (new bc)<P=aa
<P | Q=aa = <P=aa | <Q=aa
<!P=aa = ! <P=aa
<0=aa = 0
the output, a second process is started. This process performs the garbage collection.
It 3rst tries to input a trigger object o-locked with aa. It then proceeds to reclaim
one tagged object, and releases the trigger to allow further collection. The encoding
of the collect(aa) is then simply to output a trigger object to start the collection. It is
interesting to note that tagging can be performed without gaining any knowledge about
the contents of the object being tagged. This approach is quite /exible, multiple tags
can be applied to the same object without risk of interference, and the applications that
operate on the object need not be aware that tags are present. This means that diNerent
collection policies may be composed.
4.3.2. Object revocation
Tagging is a basic mechanisms that can be used to implement collection policies.
One example policy is revocation on exit, that is, when an application terminates all of
the objects it generated that are still in the shared space must be removed. To reclaim
objects in the shared space, it is necessary to be able to diNerentiate between objects
that belong to distinct applications. We de3ne a translation scheme that marks each
application with a diNerent key. Thus in the case we have two processes P and Q, the
term <P=pp | <Q=qq denotes the composition of the two processes where all outputs are
properly tagged as de3ned in the table below. Revocation of a process simply entails
invoking collect(pp) (Table 6).
4.3.3. Hygienic protocols
Another reclamation policy is to enforce protocol hygiene, that is each protocol run
must ensure that no outstanding message is left in the shared space after the protocol’s
end. A technique for ensuring hygiene is to rely on a post protocol clean up scheme.
The idea requires that each participant in a protocol tags all of outputs that belong to a
given run. When the protocol completes successfully or aborts, a clean up procedure is
invoked. A hygienic protocol is declared with newprot aa, where aa is a fresh protocol
name. For each message of the protocol, the sender simply writes out eaa . The protocol
can then be closed by endprot aa. The encoding of these operations is simple. All
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Table 7
Hygienic protocols
out eaa
def= tag(out e; aa)
(newprot aa)P
def= (neq aa)P
(endprot aa)
def= collect(aa)
outputs in the protocol are tagged and when the protocol terminates a collection is
triggered (Table 7).
One interesting point about these marking schemes and the associated collectors is
that they are compositional. Several collection algorithms may run concurrently in the
same secure space without application interference. The collectors are trusted to the
point of being able to reclaim objects but no more; in particular, they cannot observe
information contained in the objects that they collect.
4.4. Summary
We have presented secure spaces—a coordination model that extends generative
communication with 3ne grained access control primitives. We have shown that these
primitives are adequate for implementing more powerful security mechanisms, and that
we have lost none of the expressiveness of Linda. We now turn to the question of
practicality and argue that our extensions can be e8ciently implemented and used in
a mainstream programming language such as JAVA.
5. The SECOS coordination infrastructure
Secure spaces have been implemented in JAVA. The implementation, termed SECOS,
was originally conceived for and used in the JAVASEAL mobile agent platform [4] as an
agent communication mechanism for untrusted agents running on the same platform.
The implementation is a single machine implementation. We have experimented with
extensions for a distributed setting, but several issues dealing with the secrecy of
keys remain open. This section overviews the SECOS interface and then discusses
implementation and e8ciency considerations.
5.1. Secure spaces in Java
The public interface of SECOS has been kept simple and small. The three classes
shown in Fig. 2 are the only classes visible to users of the system. SSpace implements
the shared data space, space objects are represented by the class SObject and 3nally
labels are represented by the SKey class.
Data spaces are created with the factory method makeSSpace which returns a ref-
erence to a data space. In the current implementation, only one data space can be
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Fig. 2. SECOS public classes.
created in each virtual machine. To ensure this, the SSpace constructor is not public.
Spaces have three public methods, out to output an object, in to perform a destruc-
tive read, and read to perform a nondestructive read. inp and readp are nonblock-
ing variants of the above operations, they return null if the template could not be
matched.
The SObject class is an immutable container. Once an object has been created it is
guaranteed not to change. Immutability is an essential property for the implementation,
as the shared space builds indices that rely on the fact that the keys and values in an
object are not modi3ed after they are inserted in the space. An SObject contains an
array of 3elds that are key-value pairs. The keys must be a SKey instance while the
value are subtypes of Serializable. An SObject can be extended with additional
3elds by invoking the add method; this returns a copy of the original object. Values
can be selected from an object by invoking select with a key as argument. If the
object contains a 3eld locked with that key, then the corresponding value will be
extracted, otherwise null is returned. Finally, an object can be locked with the o-lock
method. This method takes a key as argument and returns a new object o-locked under
that key.
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The SKey class stands for symmetric and asymmetric keys. There are no pub-
lic operations on keys. Keys are created by two factory methods makeSymKey and
makeAsymKeys, the latter returns a two key array containing both asymmetric keys.
Since a Java virtual machine allows untrusted code to inhabit the same address
space as the implementation of SECOS, some security measures are necessary. All
three classes in the interface are 3nal to prevent attacks that use subtyping to inject
malicious code into the kernel. Furthermore, the design of SECOS ensures that it is
not possible for user code to modify the state of the SECOS system by other means
than invoking the public methods in the interface. It also ensures that no user code will
execute within the SECOS kernel. The 3rst property is obtained by enforcing that values
exchanged between the user code and the kernel are either immutable or copied. Thus,
objects and keys are immutable, and 3eld values are serialized. Serialization ensures
that there is no sharing of mutable values between application and kernel. The use of
serialization also means that object equality checks are performed without running the
methods of these objects, instead the default bitwise comparison of serialized values is
used.
Recursive pattern matching is not implemented in the current system, and the SOb-
ject class does not implement the Serializable interface.
5.1.1. A streaming protocol
A streaming protocol transfers an ordered sequence of messages between applica-
tions. This protocol is a representative example of generative communication. We give
a straightforward implementation in SECOS consisting of two methods streamOut to
output a vector of objects to the space, and streamIn to read the ordered vector from
the space. An example of these methods is
SKey sid = SKey.makeSymKey();
streamOut(space, sid, new SObject(), values);
Vectors results = streamIn( space, sid, new SObject());
// we have results.equals(values)
The streamOut method is shown in Fig. 3. The method takes four arguments, a space,
a key, a template object and the vector of values to transfer. The key streamID is
the identi3er for this particular run of the protocol. It should be distinct from any
other instance of the same protocol. The method begins with the creation of new key,
valKey, to be used as the label for value 3elds. The 3rst object output is a header,
〈 START STREAM : streamID, streamID : valKey 〉:
The static variable START STREAM is globally visible key. Every element of the val
vector will then be output together with a sequence number in the format
〈 streamID : i, valKey : val.elementAt(i) 〉:
The stream is terminated with the object
〈 streamID : i+1, END STREAM : END STREAM 〉
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Fig. 3. Procedure for sending an ordered sequence of objects.
Fig. 4. Procedure for reading an ordered sequence of objects.
On the receiving end, the streamIn method shown in Fig. 4 takes three arguments,
a space, a stream identi3er and a template object. It starts by reading the header object
and extracting valKey. The method matches objects using the streamID and sequence
number. The end of stream is detected when an object has a non-null END STREAM
3eld.
While this protocol is eNective in transferring an ordered sequence of objects between
cooperating processes, it is still susceptible to interferences. An unrelated process may
input an element of the stream using an empty template; then the protocol gets stuck
on a missing value.
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The solution to prevent interferences is to use o-locks. In fact, the template argument
of the two methods allows us to reuse the code to implement a secure stream. All that is
needed is to call the method with matching o-locked templates. Consider the following
invocation:
SKey[] ks = SKey.makeAsymKeys();
streamOut(space, streamID, new SObject().olock(ks[1]), val);
streamIn(space, streamID, new SObject().olock(ks[2]));
Every value output by streamOut will be a copy of the o-locked object new
SObject().olock(ks[1]), where ks[1] is an asymmetric key. Every value input
by streamIn will use a template that extends new SObject().olock(ks[2]), where
ks[2] is the inverse of the key used for output.
5.2. SECOS implementation
The two basic space operations, out and particularly in, are bottlenecks for the
performance of secure spaces. We describe our approach to an e8cient implementation
and then give some performance results.
The main e8ciency problem for any of the shared data space infrastructures is the
matching of tuples that occurs during the in operation. In SECOS, matching is even
more di8cult than in Linda due to the extended pattern matching rules: order irrelevant
and shorter templates may match a longer object. Linda implementations can at least
disregard tuples of diNerent lengths during matching.
The 3rst step to making the secure space operations e8cient is to have a fast in-
equality test. Since for any given query we expect most objects not to match the
template, it is essential to be able to prune the search space e8ciently. To achieve
this, each SObject has two associated 3ngerprints. Fingerprints are bit strings with
the property that if two objects match, o6o′, then fp(o) is a subset of fp(o′). We use
one 64 bit 3ngerprint to summarize an object’s keys and another for its values. The
3ngerprints are computed by compacting every key and value down to a single bit. The
implementation uses the hashCode() function. Both 3ngerprints are thus computed as
follows:
for (int j = 0; j < keys.length; j++) {
keysFP = keysFP | (1 << (keys[j].hashCode() %64));
if ( val[j] != null)
valsFP = valsFP | (1 << (val[j].hashCode() %64));
}
An SObject contains two arrays, one with keys and the other with values. Values
can be null if the 3eld was set to the wild card (? in the calculus).
The fast inequality test for an object sobj and a template templ is thus simply
( templ.keysFP == ( templ.keysFP & sobj.keysFP ) ) &&
( templ.valsFP == ( templ.valsFP & sobj.valsFP ) )
J. Vitek et al. / Science of Computer Programming 46 (2003) 163–193 187
If the test is negative then we know for sure that template templ cannot match with
object sobj. A positive answer only indicates that there might be a match.
The second objective for e8ciency is to avoid having to compare a template against
all objects in the space. The SECOS implementation uses a binary search tree to prune
the search space. Each object is associated with a 16 bit summary, computed as the
union of the keys and values 3ngerprints,
short summary(long vfp, long kfp) {
short sum = 0;
for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < 64; i += 4, j++)
sum = sum | (((7<<i)& vfp) << j) |
(((7<<i)& kfp) << j);
return sum;
}
This 16 bit value is used to choose a leaf in the search tree where to store the object (it
prescribes a path in the binary tree). The search tree is built lazily and empty branches
are removed when detected in queries.
For any given query, with a template object templ, the search algorithm 3rst com-
putes the summary of templ. This summary will be used to prune the search space. If
bit n of the summary is 1, then we need only visit one branch at level n of the tree,
if it is 0 both branches must be taken.
For any given query, we compute a 16 bit summary for the template object and use
that summary to drive the search procedure. We need to visit only leaves that may
match the template. The search space is further pruned by keeping, at each nonleaf node
of the tree, the union of all 3ngerprints that have traversed that node. An inequality test
is performed comparing this union with template’s 3ngerprints. If they fail to match
then the search need not proceed further down this path. When a leaf node is reached
the list of objects at that node is searched reverse order of insertion.
The current implementation is tuned for moderately large spaces, of the order of
20 K objects. We have constructed synthetic benchmarks to evaluate performance and
scalability of the basic operations. The benchmark results are summarized in Figs. 5–7.
The tests were run on a dual 800MHz Intel PIII machine with 512MB main memory
using the IBM 1.3.0 virtual machine.
The 3rst benchmark measures performance of the in operation for data spaces of
diNerent sizes. The secure spaces are populated with randomly generated objects and
the measure shows the average time for the in of the last inserted object. For each
space size we measured average times of 1000 diNerent queries with diNerent object
and template sizes and characteristics. Performance is shown in operations per second.
The results are relatively constant with respect to space size with rates above 90 Kops=s
in all cases.
The second benchmark assesses performance of the read operation. It measures the
average cost of locating an arbitrary object in the data space. The performance drops
signi3cantly as the space size grows which is surprising as one would expect read
to be faster than in (it does not have to update the internal data structures). Analysis
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Fig. 5. Performance of the SECOS in operation.
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Fig. 6. Performance of the SECOS read operation.
of the data reveals that the median cost read is indeed slightly less than in, but the
average is pulled down by the extreme values. The main diNerence between the two
benchmarks is that we are not retrieving the last inserted object, instead we query for
random objects in the data space. So, in the worst case we have to traverse and check
the complete list of SObjects stored at a leaf node. For spaces of smaller than 10 K
objects we can nevertheless expect more than 30 Kops=s.
The last benchmark measures the performance of the streaming protocol presented
in Section 5.1.1. The measure indicates the average time for constructing an object,
writing it to the space, then constructing a template and retrieving a matching object.
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Fig. 7. Streaming protocol.
The data shows that for spaces up to 30 K objects, it is possible to exchange more
than 3 K objects=s.
6. Related work
Pinakis proposed a solution for secure directed communication in a Linda distributed
environment [22]. His approach is based on a new data type called a ticket. Tickets
are similar to capabilities of the Amoeba operating system, a message containing a
public ticket can only be matched by the appropriate private ticket. Our work can be
viewed as a generalization of this approach.
Minsky et al. present a law-governed approach to controlling interactions in tu-
plespaces in which Prolog rules specify constraints on the behavior of distributed agents
interacting through a shared tuplespace [19]. Security of the overall system is enforced
by a controller running on secure co-processors at each client site. The main diNerence
with our work is that the rules governing a system must be agreed upon by mutual
concensus and are static, whereas in our approach diNerent parts of a shared space can
implement diNerent access control policies and modify these policies dynamically.
KLAIM is an eNort to extend the shared space model with protection [20]. The ap-
proach taken prioritizes static veri3cation of security. Processes manipulate tuples at
abstract locations in a network. Access control policies specify what a process can
do at each site, e.g., whether it can read or write tuples. At each site a type checker
analyses the code of process to deduce its intentions—the set of access rights that it ac-
tually needs at the location—and only accepts a process on a site if it does not require
more rights than permitted by the security policy for that site. Static security analysis
is useful in many circumstances since it avoids the need for mechanisms at runtime.
Nevertheless, static veri3cation is hardly su8cient in the Internet context. Firstly, there
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are no guarantees that a process loaded is not subsequently modi3ed by an attacker to
exceed the privileges accorded to it. Secondly, there is no centralized allocator process
that all clients can trust. KLAIM is better suited to a local area networked system with
a single trusted administrator and where machines can be protected from tampering
from users. In addition, access rights in KLAIM are used to control a process reading or
writing tuples at a site; they do not control access to individual tuples. This restricts
the /exibility of the mechanism since protocols such as secure channels or memory
management cannot easily be programmed.
Our model has many similarities to the sealed object proposal by GiNord where ob-
jects are protected by sealing them with keys [14]. GiNord’s proposal aims to guarantee
secrecy and authentication for objects in a distributed system. Secrecy is enforced by
the property that an object can only be unsealed, to be read or modi3ed, by furnishing
the correct key; authentication means that keys cannot be fabricated so once an object
is sealed, only the correct matching key can unseal it. Our model also implements these
properties. GiNord’s proposal is aimed at distributed systems made up of mistrusting
nodes, where data must be encrypted as soon as it leaves a site. GiNord’s basic key
model is richer than that of Secure Spaces. As well as symmetric and asymmetric keys,
objects can be sealed with a key quorum or indirect key. A key quorum is a set of
keys used to seal an object, where a speci3ed number of keys from this set is su8cient
to unseal the object. An indirect key is generated from another key and can unseal an
object sealed with the base key. The base key associated with an indirect key can be
changed, which simpli3es key management in the system. A key quorum and indirect
keys can be used to model capabilities and access control lists. The main diNerence
in approaches is that GiNord’s proposal is implemented with cryptography, while in
SECOS the checks are performed by the kernel.
Another system with similarities to ours is the spi calculus by Abadi and Gordon [1].
This is an extension of the -calculus with primitives that encrypt and decrypt messages
sent over channels. Though scope in  is powerful enough to express access control
over channel names, encryption is awkward to express. Adding encryption primitives
allows one to reason about the secrecy and authentication of security protocols. In
secure spaces the inclusion of locking primitives is a matter of necessity rather than
choice, because of the visibility of spaces to processes. Further, since the shared data
space model is still a nonstandard communication means, we chose to address more
attention to language design issues, rather than to studying proof systems for veri3cation
of security properties.
The role of subsumption and types in the matching process has received much atten-
tion recently. The Laura system, for instance, is a WAN service architecture based on
the shared space model [26]. One reason why the shared space paradigm is exploited
is that it allows services to join and leave the system dynamically. Services place oNers
in the space which are matched with requests. An oNer or request is an interface form
that matches if the type of the service is a subtype of the requestor’s. Alice is the
type system employed for matching these interfaces [24]. Dami also investigates type
inference for generative communication [9].
As regards implementing the shared object paradigm in JAVA, we can mention JavaS-
paces [11] and Jada [8]. Jada is one example of the shared space paradigm being used
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to coordinate mobile agents: it is employed in the PageSpace agent architecture [7].
Neither Jada nor JavaSpaces were designed with security issues in mind. Though keys
can be employed to protect items in the tuple from agents, this can only be done using
encryption algorithms, even for agents executing within the same JVM, which is too
ine8cient for generalized use.
Sun’s JavaSpaces [11] have support for memory management. In this system, a
process associates a lease with a tuple that it deposits in the tuple space; the lease
speci3es the life span of that tuple. This policy is hardwired into the implementation;
the question of how reasonable limits for objects are determined is not addressed. It
is quite likely that diNerent applications will require diNerent leases; leases can vary
for some several seconds to several weeks, months or even longer. In JavaSpaces, the
garbage collector is executed within the trusted computing base of the tuple space, so
it cannot be re3ned to implement application speci3c policies.
There are many Linda variants in the literature. Multiple tuple spaces are the most
relevant to our work [6,13,16,25]. Multiple tuple spaces models permit dynamic creation
of new tuple spaces and exchange of tuple spaces as values between processes. While
multiple tuple spaces can be used to provide secure communication channels, there
is no clear solution to issues such as partial protection, key distribution or memory
management.
7. Conclusions
The goal of the work presented in this paper is to exploit the advantages of the
Linda programming model in a setting where the components being coordinated can
not be fully trusted. Our model allows for security—by controlling access to the objects
stored in shared space—and for space management—by allowing objects to be safely
removed by a garbage collector. Our solution in the SECOS coordination infrastructure
is to use 3ne grained access control based on locking. An object 3eld that is locked
with a key can only be read with the matching key. Keys are also essential in the
pattern matching process as they can be used to hide certain objects.
We developed a core language for secure spaces and presented its semantics. Spaces
are the sole process communication mechanism in this language, and object locking is
enforced by the semantics. We have also implemented the model in JAVA, and argued
that the implementation is e8cient. The SECOS implementation is being used in the
context of the JavaSeal mobile agent system [4]. Each agent platform on the network
possesses a space which is used by agents that arrive at the site to communicate with
services and static agents. Our current work is aimed at improving e8ciency and at
a distributed implementation with cryptographic protection for objects exchanged over
the Internet.
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